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EDUCATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE EFFECT OF IMPASSE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES ON PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
Jessica Nixon*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s and 70s, the spread of strikes by teachers prompted many states
to enact collective bargaining statutes to codify the means of negotiations between
teachers and school districts.1 Today, thirty-five states authorize collective bargaining and
utilize mediation, fact-finding procedures, and/or arbitration procedures to settle
bargaining impasses.2 In addition, in collective bargaining statutes, twenty-seven states
now prohibit teacher strikes and eighteen states impose penalties for teacher strikes. 3 As
a result of this type of state legislation, both national and local teachers’ unions have
emerged as powerful entities that negotiate collective bargaining agreements on behalf of
teachers.4
As evidenced by the recent the controversy surrounding the Chicago Teachers’
Union strike5 and Wisconsin’s Act 10 legislation,6 the debate over teachers’ wages is a
prevalent source of controversy in negotiations with school districts. Historically, a
teachers’ strike or threat of strike was a powerful tool for teachers’ unions to gain
leverage such negotiations. However, with the statutory trend of prohibiting teachers’
strikes, teachers’ unions struggle to achieve goals, especially wage increase goals, in the
negotiation process. As a substitute for the right to strike, arbitration impasse procedures
are seen as a way that teachers’ unions may achieve success in the collective bargaining
process, particularly with respect to guaranteeing higher wages for teachers in the public
sector.7
This article will examine how alternative dispute resolution impasse procedures
impact the achievement of public school teachers’ unions’ goals in collective bargaining
*
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1
See Emily Workman, State Collective Bargaining Policies for Teachers, Education Commission of
the States, Dec. 2011, available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/99/78/9978.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
2
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5
See Chicago Teachers’ Union, Tentative Agreement Between Board and CTU, Chicago Teachers
Union Blog (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ctunet.com/blog/text/Contract_Highlights_2012_09_18.pdf (last
visited Apr. 6, 2013); see also Chicago Public Schools, Tentative Agreement: Agreement Between the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, American
Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, (Sept. 26, 2012) at 110-17 available at
http://www.cps.edu/sitecollectiondocuments/2012_2015BoardCTUTentativeAgreement.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2013).
6
See A.B. 10, 2011-12 Leg., Jan. 2011 Special Sess., § 168 (Wis. 2011) (amending the State’s
collective bargaining statute which effects wage increases for public employees in collective bargaining
process).
7
Michael Finch & Trevor W. Nagle, Collective Bargain in the Public Schools: Reassessing Labor
Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1573 (1984).
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negotiations with school districts. Section II will focus on the history and current
landscape of collective bargaining in public education. Section III will focus on how
collective bargaining affects the achievement of public school teachers’ unions’ goals.
This section first examines the political power of public school teachers’ unions then
moves on to discuss more specifically the ways in which public school teachers’ unions
can achieve increased wages for their members. The analysis continues with a discussion
of the Chicago Teachers’ Union strike to provide evidence of the reasons that resolution
of collective bargaining impasses by arbitration is preferable to resolution by teachers’
strikes. Finally, by examining Wisconsin’s Act 10 legislation, the article examines the
benefit of equal power in the bargaining process that can be achieved by arbitration of
collective bargaining impasses between teachers’ unions and school districts.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History: The Rise of Collective Bargaining in Public Education

The rise in the prevalence of teachers’ strikes during the 1960s and 1970s resulted
in state codification of negotiation procedures between teachers and school boards in the
form of collective bargaining statutes.8 During this period, the two prominent national
teachers’ unions, the National Education Association (“NEA”) and the American
Federation of Teachers (“AFT”), struggled to gain membership, which prompted the
spread of the strikes by teachers.9 These national teachers’ unions were able to
accomplish their goal of increased membership after 20,000 teachers participated in a
one-day walk-out called by a local affiliate of AFT in New York City during 1962. 10 As a
result of the walk-out, New York City mayor, Richard Wagner, allowed the teachers to
vote whether to pursue formal collective bargaining.11 Later that year, the local union
secured the first, collective bargaining agreement between a teachers’ union and the city,
offering a $1,000 pay increase and duty free lunches.12 The substantial gains achieved by
the teachers’ union in New York City prompted the national teachers’ unions to pursue
similar work-stoppage tactics in attempt to further their organizational efforts.13 By 1968,
such efforts culminated in 112 strikes by public school teachers and librarians, resulting
in 2,194,000 man-days of work lost.14 Due to the effect of the militant-style, workstoppage tactics, membership in the AFT soared during a time period in which

8

Workman, supra note 1, at 1.
Robert W. Neirynck, Teachers’ Strikes—A New Militancy, 19:5 LAB. L.J. 292, 293 (1968).
10
Id. at 294.
11
Federick M. Hess & Martin R. West, A Better Bargain: Overhauling Teacher Collective
Bargaining for the 21st Century, Harvard University – Program on Education Policy & Governance, at 15
(2006) available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/BetterBargain.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
12
Id.; see also Neirynck, supra note 9, at 294.
13
Neirynck, supra note 9, at 294 (commenting that the success of the 1962 teachers’ walk-out and the
rivalry between the NEA and the AFT prompted the NEA to become involved in work stoppages).
14
Paul Ritterband, Ethnic Power and the Public Schools: The New York City School Strike of 1968,
47:2 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 251 (1974).
9
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membership in organized labor only increased by 5% nationally.15 In addition to
increased membership, public school teachers’ unions gained greater power in
negotiations with school boards as public sector collective bargaining legislation spread
across the country.16
Public sector collective bargaining, which applies to collective bargaining in the
context of public education, is fundamentally distinguishable from private sector
collective bargaining. The primary distinction is that “in private employment collective
bargaining is a process of private decision making shaped primarily by market forces,
while in public employment it is a process of governmental decision making shaped
ultimately by political forces.”17 Other distinguishing characteristics include the public
interest involved in public sector bargaining and the sources of funding. 18 These
differences have the potential to become problematic in public education collective
bargaining settings where there labor relations staff lack training in dealing with the
challenges presented by the collective bargaining process.19
Despite these fundamental differences between public and private sector
collective bargaining, the principles which govern private collective bargaining relations
are applicable to public collective bargaining. In 1962, the United States Supreme Court,
in NLRB v. Katz,20 established the doctrine that governs collective bargaining in the
private sector.21 The Court held that a “unilateral change in conditions of employment
under negotiation is. . . a violation of the good faith bargaining provision of the [National
Labor Relations Act].”22 The application of the Katz doctrine to the public sector,
especially public education collective bargaining, is appropriate for three reasons. First,
the consequences that allegedly stem from differences between private and public sector
collective bargaining are overstated.23 Second, the rational for the Katz doctrine is the
same in either sector: prohibiting unilateral changes by the employer promotes collective
bargaining which is the policy objective behind the National Labor Relations Act as well
as public sector collective bargaining laws.24 Finally, most states have modeled their
labor laws, which contain the collective bargaining statutes, on the National Labor
15

Id.; see also Hess & West, supra note 11, at 15 (explaining such tactics also prompted the NEA to
adopt a favorable approach to collective bargaining).
16
Workman, supra note 1, at 1.
17
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156
(1994).
18
Steven J. Scott, The Status Quo Doctrine: An Application to Salary Step Increases for Teachers, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 194, 208 (1997) (explaining the development of the legal doctrine of public sector
bargaining).
19
Lee C. Shaw & Theodore R. Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector
Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. REV. 867, 890 (1971) (arguing that a lack of a distinct labor relations
staff in such public settings creates uncertainty regarding the responsibilities that accompany collective
bargaining).
20
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
21
Scott, supra note 18, at 205.
22
Id. (quoting Katz, 369 U.S. at 743).
23
Id. at 210-11 (arguing that significant political constraints on public sector bargaining reduce the
political power that is feared to be at work, that the public is not excluded from the negotiation of the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement in public education negotiations, and that public officials have
flexibility to overcome funding concerns).
24
Id. at 211-12 (“[W]hen employers impose unilateral changes to collective agreements in the public
sector, it undercuts the bargaining process much as it does in the private sector.”).
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Relations Act, which governed the Court’s ruling in Katz.25 Therefore, the distinguishable
characteristics of the public and private sector in collective bargaining do not impact the
application of the Katz doctrine to public sector collective bargaining.26
B. Current Landscape: State Approaches to Collective Bargaining in Public
Education
No federal law exists that governs collective bargaining in public education, or the
public sector generally; therefore, state labor laws supply the rules for collective
bargaining in the public sector. Today, thirty-five states’ laws make collective bargaining
available to public school teachers while three states strictly prohibit collective
bargaining by public school employees.27 The collective bargaining statutes in states that
permit public education employees to engage in the process differ in several ways. First,
state collective bargaining statutes dictate whether employees are excluded from
collective bargaining with school boards. These various collective bargaining statutes
have a wide range of applicability, such as coverage for all public school employees,
coverage for public school employees that do not serve a managerial or supervisory role,
or excluding all public school employees except teachers.28 Second, state collective
bargaining state laws specify which issues are negotiable. Most states limit the scope of
bargaining to wages, hours, and terms of employment. While others are more permissive,
allowing negotiation over matters as specific as classroom curriculum.29
Collective bargaining statutes govern bargaining impasse procedures in the event
that a resolution cannot be reached between a public school’s bargaining unit and a
school board. The common procedures employed by the are mediation, fact-finding, and
arbitration, either exclusively or by some combination thereof. 30 Where collective
bargaining impasses are submitted to mediation, a neutral third party mediator attempts to
broker an agreement between the parties.31 When fact-finding procedures are utilized, a
panel reviews both sides of the dispute and makes non-binding recommendations based
on its findings for the parties to use to reach a resolution.32 In the arbitration of collective
bargaining impasses, a third party or panel conducts a formal hearing, determines a
resolution for the dispute, and issues a binding and final ruling.33
25

Id. at 212.
See Scott supra note 18, at 213 (indicating that New York, New Jersey, Tennessee, California,
Oregon, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, and Illinois have either judicially or
legislatively adopted the Katz doctrine to govern public sector collective bargaining).
27
Workman, supra note 1, at 2; cf., Workman, supra note 1, at 9, 12 (indicating that collective
bargaining is explicitly prohibited in North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.).
28
Workman, supra note 1, at 2-13.
29
Id. at 1-13.
30
Id. at 1; see also id.at 4 (indicating that in Illinois, fact-finding, mediation, and voluntary arbitration
are statutorily permissible means to resolve a collective bargaining impasse).
31
Id. (explaining also that thirty-two states’ collective bargaining statutes provide mediation in the
event of an impasse); see also, e.g., id. at 3, 6, 11, 13 (indicating that mediation is the only impasse
procedure available in Idaho, Michigan, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
32
Id. at 1-2 (explaining also that twenty states’ collective bargaining statutes provide the fact-finding
procedure in the event of an impasse); see also, e.g., id. at 9 (indicating that Oklahoma is the only
collective bargaining state in which fact-finding is the sole impasse procedure available).
33
Workman, supra note 1, at 1-2.
26
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There are generally two types of arbitration procedures offered in collective
bargaining statutes. The first, and more common form, is voluntary arbitration where
either side of a collective bargaining impasse may request an arbitral hearing. 34 The other
is mandatory arbitration where both sides of the impasse are required to submit to a
formal arbitral hearing if an agreement cannot be reached.35 Finally, in addition to setting
forth the rules of collective bargaining, the statutes also dictate whether public school
employees are permitted to strike should collective bargaining fail. A majority of
collective bargaining statutes prohibit strikes by public school teachers and several
impose penalties for such action.36 A minority, however, permit strikes by public school
teachers, though, in some instances, certain conditions must be met before a strike is
permissible.37
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Political Power of Public School Teachers’ Unions

Public school teachers’ unions have become powerful interest groups in politics.
The two most prominent national teachers’ unions, the NEA and the AFT, contributed $59
million to federal campaigns between 1990 and 2010.38 According to Andrew J. Coulson,
teachers’ unions are politically powerful because “[p]eople like teachers, and voters listen
to what they think teachers are telling them. Add that overall positive reputation to a huge
pile of money, and you’ve got a pretty formidable political force.”39 As evidence of the
political sway that public school teachers’ unions are able to exercise, many scholars have
argued that teachers’ unions have shaped education policy and dictated public school
operations through collective bargaining. One of the earliest studies examining the impact
of teachers’ unions found that “collective bargaining has been a principal cause of: (1)
substantially altered definitions of teachers’ work responsibilities; (2) basic changes in the
mechanisms which control how teachers will perform their jobs; and (3) modifications in
the authority available to school principals and other middle managers.”40

34

Id. (indicating also that twenty states’ collective bargaining statutes offer voluntary arbitration in
the event of an impasse); see also id. at 2-13 ( indicating that in no collective bargaining state is voluntary
arbitration the only available impasse procedure).
35
Id. at 1-2 (indicating also that only two states, Alaska and Connecticut, provide mandatory
arbitration and that neither Alaska nor Connecticut mandate arbitration as the only impasse procedure).
36
Id. at 1-2 (indicating also that twenty-seven states prohibit strikes, eighteen of which impose
penalties for such action); see also, id. (explaining that where strikes are prohibited and the state imposes
penalties, such penalties could take the form of fines, dismissal, and even imprisonment.).
37
Id. at 1-2 (indicating also that eight states permit strikes by public school teachers); see also id. at 113 (indicating that Alaska, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont do not impose conditions before a strike is
permissible whereas Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania require certain conditions to be met.)
38
Andrew J. Coulson, The Effects of Teachers Unions on American Education, 30 CATO J. 155
(2010) (explaining that public school unions are politically partisan).
39
Hess & West, supra note 11, at 12 (quoting Republican political strategist Dan Schnur).
40
Douglas E. Mitchell, Charles T. Kerchner, Wayne Erck & Gabrielle Pryor, The Impact of Collective
Bargaining on School Management and Policy, 89 AM. J. EDUC. 147, 155 (1981) (identifying policy arenas
in which the impact of collective bargaining is most substantial).
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More recent studies indicate that collective bargaining continues to have similar
effects on public education. In 2005, there were 199 teacher collective bargaining
agreements on file at the Bureau of Labor Statistics,41 which spanned an average of 105
pages and governed everything from the expected salary and benefit issues to the
mundane details of a standard school day.42 In addition their role in navigating collective
bargaining process, public school teachers’ unions are active and supportive in recruiting
school board candidates.43 By creating strong political coalitions through campaign
contribution and school board candidate recruitment, teachers’ unions will be able to
achieve new goals in shaping education policy and collective bargaining laws.44
B. Achieving Public School Teachers’ Unions Goal of Increasing Wages
Although teachers’ unions attempt to achieve a range of multiple objectives, they
undoubtedly seek to raise their members’ wages.45 Public school teachers’ unions have
used collective bargaining to pursue the goal of increasing their members’ wages,46 and
although teachers’ wages have increased since the 1950s, public school teachers’ wages
actually decreased during the decade when collective bargaining was spreading across the
nation and unions were becoming more powerful.47 According to the NEA, improving the
wages of public school teachers is a primary objective because “[l]ow teacher pay comes
at a high cost for schools and kids, who lose good teachers to better-paying
professions.”48 The AFT also maintains that improving wages of public school teachers is
a crucial objective, basing its conclusion on the results of a salary survey. 49 The results of
the survey indicated that teachers’ salaries increased by 4.5% in 2007, pushing the
average wage of public school teachers over $50,000 for the first time.50 Although this is
the largest increase in public school teachers’ wages since 1987,51 public school teachers
still make approximately seventy cents on the dollar of professionals with comparable
education and training.52 Another important finding that supports the unions’ continued
focus on improving their members’ wages is that only 47 percent of public school

41

Hess & West, supra note 11, at 9.
Id.
43
Mitchell, Kerchner, Erck, & Pryor, supra note 40, at 170.
44
Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers’ Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q. J. ECON. 671,
688 (1996).
45
Coulson, supra note 38, at 155-56 (indicating that public school teachers’ unions’ objectives
generally include: “(1) raising their members’ wages, (2) growing their membership, (3) increasing the
share of the public school labor force that they represent, (4) precluding pay based on performance or
aptitude, and (5) minimizing competition from nonunion shops.”).
46
Id. at 158.
47
Id.
48
National Education Association, Our Position & Actions on Professional Pay,
http://www.nea.org/home/1277.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
49
See generally American Federation of Teachers, Survey and Analysis of Teacher Salary Trends
2007 (2008), available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/teachers/salarysurvey07.pdf.
50
Id. at 1.
51
Id.
52
Id. at Executive Summary.
42
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teachers reported being satisfied with their salaries,53 indicating that public education
collective bargaining, in its current form, has not been as powerful of a mechanism as
expected for public school teachers’ unions to improve their members’ wages.54
In order for public school teachers’ unions to be successful in achieving their goal
of raising their members’ wages, collective bargaining statutes should include binding
arbitration for resolution of impasses in negotiations. There are several reasons to expect
that arbitration will increase public school teachers’ wages. 55 First, arbitration as an
impasse procedure in collective bargaining could transfer the ultimate salary authority
from self-interested officials to a neutral party capable of rendering a binding resolution
to the dispute.56 Also, according to Professor Finch and Michael Nagel, “because binding
arbitration is often viewed as a substitute for the employees' right to strike, unions expect
some improvement in outcomes over those resulting from collective bargaining alone.”57
Furthermore, statutory criteria typically direct arbitrators to examine comparable salaries
in the labor market, thus low paid employees could invoke or threaten to invoke
arbitration in order to achieve more equal pay.58 Finally, the use of arbitration to resolve
collective bargaining disputes in other public sectors has a history of causing an increase
in wages for employees.59
A comparison of teachers’ salaries in states that provide for mandatory binding
arbitration as an impasse procedure to those that do not is one way to test whether the
desired results will actually be produced.60 The two states that provide for mandatory
arbitration in their collective bargaining statutes as means to resolve impasse disputes in
negotiations are Alaska and Connecticut.61 The average salary of public school teachers’
in these states as compared to the national average salary may shed light on the likelihood
that arbitration requirements in public education collective bargaining will raise public
school teachers’ wages.62 In 2007, the national average salary of public school teachers
was $51,009.63 In the same year, the average salary of public school teachers in Alaska
was $54,678, the eleventh highest average in the nation.64 The average salary in

53

Id. at 5 (reporting also that ninety-one percent of public school teachers reported they were satisfied
with being a teacher).
54
See, e.g. Coulson, supra note 38, at 159.
55
Finch & Nagel, supra note 7, at 1631.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1632.
58
Id.
59
Jeffery H. Keefe, A Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of Wellington’s and Winter’s, The
Unions and the Cities (1971) 7-8 (June 4, 2012) (working paper) (on file with Employment Policy Research
Network) available at http://www.employmentpolicy.org/topic/402 (follow “Wellington’s and Winter’s
‘The Unions and the Cities’” hyperlink) (presenting data which illustrates that the effect of providing
arbitration to resolve collective bargaining impasses was increased wages for police officers in over 800
departments) (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
60
Finch & Nagel, supra note 7, at 1632-33 (explaining that a common method to estimate the salary
effect of compulsory arbitration “is to measure the salary differential between those parties who actually
use arbitration procedures and those who do not.”).
61
Workman, supra note 1, at 2.
62
This proposed analysis is simplistic and does not take into account other factors which may
influence public school teachers’ wages such as the cost of living.
63
American Federation of Teachers, supra note 49, at 13.
64
Id. at 16.
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Connecticut in 2007 was $61,039, the second highest average in the nation.65
Additionally, a similar comparison of the average beginning teacher salaries also
indicates that mandatory arbitration positively affects public school teachers’ salaries. For
example, in 2007, the beginning teacher salary nationally was $35,284; 66 in Alaska was
$42,006;67 and in Connecticut was $41,497.68 Based on these averages, mandatory
arbitration in public education collective bargaining to resolve impasses in negotiations is
likely a factor contributing to higher salaries to public school teachers.69 Thus, by
including arbitration as a resolution procedure to impasses during negotiations with
school boards in collective bargaining statutes public school teachers’ unions are likely to
be able to secure higher wages for their members.
C. Resolution by Arbitration is Preferable to Public School Teachers’ Strikes
Arbitration as a means to resolve negotiation impasses is often considered to be a
substitute to strikes by public school teachers.70 Although teacher strikes prompted the
rise of collective bargaining during the 1960s and 70s,71 states generally deny such action
as means for public school teachers’ unions to achieve goals of negotiations with school
boards.72 There are several public policy reasons why states deny public school teachers’
unions the right to strike if an impasse in negotiations occurs. For example, according to
Professor Finch and Michael Nagel, “strike prohibition is thought necessary to preserve
the political and economic integrity of local government” by preventing public school
teachers’ unions from exercising disproportionate political leverage.73 Additionally,
strikes teachers’ unions “generally are defensive in nature” because “strike use affects
salary changes but not salary levels.”74 Moreover, teachers’ union strikes are harmful to

65

Id.
Id. at 21.
67
Id. at 24 (indicating that the average beginning public school teacher salary in Alaska was the
second highest in the nation).
68
American Federation of Teachers, supra note 49, at 24 (indicating that the average beginning public
school teacher salary in Connecticut was the third highest in the nation).
69
See Finch & Nagel, supra note 7, at 1646 ("[T]he best available evidence from the educational and
non-educational employment sectors suggests that teachers' salaries may be moderately inflated by the
introduction of binding arbitration procedures.”).
70
Id. at 1578 (“[Binding arbitration is] a viable legislative response to the problem of teachers' strikes,
as arbitration laws are highly successful in preventing strikes, and offer teachers a form of bargaining
leverage that appears to be no less effective than strike activity.”).
71
Workman, supra note 1, at 1.
72
Id. at 2 (indicating that a majority of states prohibit public school teachers from striking); see also
Finch & Nagel, supra note 7 at 1582 (explaining that in states where public school teachers are permitted
to strike, such action is usually only allowed if other conciliatory procedures have been exhausted).
73
Finch & Nagel, supra note 7, at 1583; contra Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike:
Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 321 (1993) (“[P]ublic employee strikes do not distort
the political process. Rather, public employees strike against the very interest groups -- the users and
purchasers of their services -- against whom they must compete in the political process.”).
74
Malin, supra note 73, at 323 (“In Canada, for example, where the right to strike is more prevalent in
the public sector, unions achieve greater wage increases through interest arbitration than through threatened
and actual strikes.”).
66
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students because they cause student standardized test scores to drop,75 result in increased
the number of students repeating grades,76 and pose dangers to student achievement in
higher education.77
The Chicago Teachers’ Union strike illustrates how utilizing strikes to resolve
collective bargaining disputes is less beneficial than arbitration as an impasse procedure.
In Illinois, state law pertaining to public education employees allows for collective
bargaining of issues surrounding wage, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.78
The statute provides that if negotiations between a public school teachers’ union and a
school board reach an impasse, the dispute may be submitted to fact-finding, mediation,
or voluntary arbitration.79 The act also permits the right to strike so long as certain
conditions have been satisfied.80 Within the language statute, the legislature states that
the policy rationale behind the act is that “unresolved disputes between the educational
employees and their employers are injurious to the public, and the General Assembly is
therefore aware that adequate means must be established for minimizing them and
providing for their resolution.”81 After reaching a bargaining impasse with Chicago
Public Schools (CPS)82 and participating in fact-finding resolution procedures in May
2012,83 the Chicago Teachers’ Union (CTU) took advantage of its right to strike in
September 2012.
In the events leading up to the strike, the fact-finding panel issued its report to the
CTU and the Chicago Board of Education (the “Board”).84 A few of the matters on which
the panel made recommendations include the duration of the agreement, wage increases,
and compensation for longer workday requirements. The panel accepted the Board’s
proposal for the duration of the agreement, recommending that the agreement between
the parties be for a total of four years.85 With regards to the parties’ wage increase
proposals, the panel found the CTU request too high and the Board request too low, and
thus recommended a compromise that for the first two years the wage increase should be
75

Dylan Matthews, How Teacher Strikes Hurt Student Achievement, THE WASHINGTON POST Workblog, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/10/how-teacherstrikes-hurt-student-achievement/ (citing Michael Baker, Industrial Actions in Schools: Strikes and Student
Achievement, Nat’l Bureau of Econ Research (2011) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16846))
(last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
76
Id. (citing Michèle Belot & Dinand Webbink, Do Teacher Strikes Harm Educational Attainment of
Students?, 24 LABOUR 391 (Dec. 2010)).
77
Id.
78
115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1; see also Workman, supra note 1, at 4.
79
115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1; see also Workman, supra note 1, at 4.
80
115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1; see also Workman, supra note 1, at 4.
81
115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1.
82
Chicago Public Schools, About CPS, (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Pages/AboutCPS.aspx (indicating that Chicago Public Schools serves over
400,000 students, making it the third-largest public school district in the nation) (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
83
Chicago Teachers’ Union, CTU-CPS Negotiations Move to Fact Finding, Apr. 16, 2012,
http://www.ctunet.com/media/press-releases/ctu-cps-negotiations-move-to-fact-finding (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
84
See generally Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. Chicago Teachers’ Union, Local 1, Am. Fed’n of
Teachers, AFL-CIO, Arb. Ref. 12.178 (Fact-Finding) (2012) (Benn, Fact-Finder) [hereinafter “FactFinding Report”] available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/backtalk/FactFinderRpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
85
Id. at 23.
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2.25% and for the second two years 2.50%.86 The panel, based on statutory authority,
accepted the Board’s proposal for longer workday requirements. In order to compensate
teachers for the longer workday requirements, the panel recommended a 12.6% wage
increase over the wage earned by public school teachers in the last agreement. 87 The
neutral third-party fact finder, who issued the report, reasoned that the recommendations
were appropriate given the “profound implications” at stake in the negotiations and the
“toxic” collective bargaining relationship of the parties.88
After the report was issued on July 19, 2012, each party had a period of fifteen
days to reject the recommendations and if either party rejected the recommendations,
negotiations would continue. Both the Board and the CTU filed notices rejecting of the
recommendations, basing their reasoning on separate fact-finding opinions filed by their
respective panel members. In large part, the Board rejected the recommendations because
it insisted that its proposed 2% wage increase was adequate given the already high
compensation of CPS employees and that such a rate was necessary to prevent layoffs
and detrimental large classroom sizes.89 On the other hand, the CTU concurred with the
recommendations regarding the wage increases but rejected the fact-finding report
because, among other issues, it maintained that the duration of the contract should only
be two years.90
As a result of both parties’ rejection of the fact-finding report, negotiations
between the CTU and the Board continued. The parties could not reach a resolution to
their disagreements and on August 29, 2012, the CTU filed a ten-day notice of strike with
the Illinois Education Labor Relations Board.91 Union President Karen Lewis said the
action was “the only way to get the Board’s attention and show them we are serious about
getting a fair contract which will give our students the resources they deserve.”92 The
CTU acknowledged that the negotiations resulted in agreement on some provisions of the
contract; however, the parties still remained “far apart” on “bigger issues such as
wages.”93 In response to the CTU’s notice of intent to strike, Chief Executive Officer of
Chicago Public Schools, Jean-Claude Brizard, issued a statement indicating that members
of the Board and CTU leadership would continue to meet every day in attempt to avoid a
strike.94 The Board indicated that a strike would be harmful to students, however, if a

86

Id. at 29.
Id. at 43.
88
Id. at 11-12.
89
Separate Opinion of Panel Member Joseph T. Moriarty at the Conclusion of Fact-Finding. Arb. Ref.
12.178, 7 (2012) available at http://www.ctunet.com/blog/text/CPSOPINION.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
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strike were to occur they were “prepared to provide [the] students with the services they
need to keep them fed and in a safe environment with positive activities.”95
Negotiations after the notice of intent to strike was filed, again, proved to be
unsuccessful. On September 9, 2012, the CTU announced that the strike would begin the
following day at approximately 675 schools.96 While members of the CTU took to the
picket lines, the Board and CPS implemented their “Children First” plan which “includes
providing a safe environment, daily meals and positive, engaging activities for
students.”97 After students were out of the classroom for eight school days, the CTU and
the Board reached a tentative agreement and CPS schools were reopened on September
19, 2012.98 The tentative agreement presented a three year contract term (with an
optional fourth year) and offered teachers a three percent wage increase in the first year
and a two percent wage increase the following two years while modifying the payment
method to an hourly type system to compensate for longer school day lengths.99 Although
the tentative agreement ended the strike, the agreement was still subject to approval by
the members of the CTU and the Board. On October 3, 2012, seventy-nine percent of
union members who voted on the proposed contract approved.100 On October 24, 2012,
the Board approved the contract.101
The resolution of perhaps the most contentious issue in the dispute between the
CTU and CPS, teachers’ wages, illustrates reasons that binding arbitration should be
preferred over teachers’ strikes to resolve impasses in public education collective
bargaining. It is important to note that both the pay raise recommended by the factfinding report and the raise achieved by the contract totaled a seven percent increase over
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three years.102 Also, other recommendations rejected by the parties were not substantially
different from the terms of the contract that was ultimately approved after the strike.103
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume, had the parties accepted the recommendations of
the neutral fact-finder, the contract between the CTU and the Board would be
substantially similar to approved contract. This suggests that a resolution of the dispute
by a binding arbitration procedure probably could have avoided the negative
consequences of the strike which stemmed from the fact that over 300,000 students were
denied classroom instruction for the duration of the strike. For example, eighty-four
percent of CPS students in need did not have access to daily breakfasts and lunches
provided by the schools.104 Also of concern was the impact the strike would have on high
school juniors and seniors who would have less time to prepare and plan for attainment of
higher education.105 Finally, the strike disrupted many families’ routines, causing parents
to either miss days of work or to find alternative sources of care for their children while
schools were closed.106 The long-term implications of each of these immediate
consequences are deeply concerning to the students’ and schools’ future. Thus, rather than
seeking to resolve impasses in collective bargaining by teachers’ strikes, teachers’ unions
should strive to include binding arbitration procedures in collective bargaining statutes.
D. Creating Equal Power to Affect Final Outcomes of Collective Bargaining
Wisconsin Act 10, enacted during a special legislative session in March 2011, to
several state statutes, altered bargaining by public school employees107including
collective bargaining with school districts.108 Under this provision, the only issue
required to be negotiated is teachers’ wages and only when those wages are not greater
than the cost of living.109 Another provision of the Act requires that public school
teachers’ unions obtain approval from a majority of their members for recertification and
to do so annually.110 The impasse procedures of the collective bargaining statute in
Wisconsin, unchanged by Act 10, provide for mediation but not voluntary or mandatory
arbitration in negotiating collective bargaining agreements in public education.111
In response to Act 10, with the support of the state teachers’ union, Wisconsin
Education Association Council (WEAC), and the NEA, a municipal public school
teachers’ union filed Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker in the State of Wisconsin Circuit
Court.112 The plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that the legislation violated the
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constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association as well as the Equal
Protection Clause.113 The court held that parts of Act 10 are unconstitutional as
restrictions imposed on public school teachers’ unions “single out and encumber the
rights of those employees who choose union membership and representation solely
because of that association and therefore infringe upon the rights of free speech and
association.”114 The court found “when the government elects to permit collective
bargaining it may not make the surrender or restriction of a constitutional right a
condition of that privilege.”115 The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the statutes do not
prohibit speech or associational activities, the statutes do impose burdens on employees’
exercise of those rights when they do so for the purpose of recognition of their
association as an exclusive bargaining agent.”116
The court also held that parts of Act 10 are unconstitutional because they violate
of the Equal Protection Clause. It was determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review because the statutes “single out for special requirements and
prohibitions, those employees who choose to belong to certain organizations, solely
because of the purpose for which the organizations are formed and the employees choose
to associate.”117 The court reasoned that Act 10 creates two distinct classes that are
similarly situated, and treated disparately, and therefore, held that such treatment is
unconstitutional when subjected to strict scrutiny.118 Also reasoned that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the burden to “show that ‘the statute treats members of a similarly situated class
differently’” in order to sustain their challenge to Act 10 on equal protection grounds.119
Based on the court’s ruling in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, the public
schools teachers’ unions’ challenge to Wisconsin Act 10 appears to have been successful.
It is important to note, however, that the case is currently appending appeal by the
defendants. Also of consequence to the consideration of the teachers’ unions’ challenge
is that on October 23, 2012, the deciding court denied the defendants’ request for a stay
of the opinion, thus preventing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 10 from taking
affect while the appeal is pending.120 For these reasons, the state of the law governing
public education collective bargaining in Wisconsin is currently in flux. However, there
are parts of the Act 10 legislation, and the collective bargaining statute, which will remain
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binding on public education collective bargaining in Wisconsin regardless of the outcome
of the appellate decision.121 First, wages will remain to be the only mandatory subject of
collective bargaining in public education collective bargaining.122 Yet, public school
teachers’ unions may freely bargain for any level of wage increases unless the appellate
court reverses this part of the ruling.123 Additionally, teachers’ unions and school boards
may only negotiate one year contracts.124 However, pending appeal, public school
teachers’ unions are not required to recertify annually without a formal request.125
Furthermore, because neither party challenged the impasse procedures, if
education collective bargaining reaches an impasse, attempts to resolve the dispute ends
with mediation rather than binding arbitration regardless of the outcome of the appeal.126
“As a result, school boards retain significant control over the final decisions to be made
in regard to the management of the school district after they meet in good faith with their
bargaining units and attempt to reach a voluntary agreement.”127 Taking this notion into
account, if an impasse is reached during the collective bargaining process, and the school
board rejects the suggestion of the mediator, there are two theoretical scenarios which
may result: First, the public school teachers’ union, in theory, may choose to exercise its
right to strike in an attempt to pressure the school board to accept its terms of the
negotiations. However, this option is not available to public school teachers’ unions in
Wisconsin128 and, as discussed above, creates a situation in which unfortunate
consequences could result. Alternatively, the school board could determine the final
outcome of the negotiations and, the terms of which the public school teachers’ union
must accept lest the represented teachers face a jobless future.129
Therefore, as a solution to the type of predicament that public school teachers’
unions face under the status quo of collective bargaining in Wisconsin, unions should
strive to include binding arbitration as an impasse resolution procedure in the collective
bargaining statute. The analysis of the political power of public school teachers’ unions
and the Act 10 controversy indicate that such a goal is attainable. First, public school
teachers’ unions are successful political advocates, able to shape public education at local
levels, thus also able to influence collective bargaining statutes. Also, the controversy
surrounding Wisconsin’s Act 10 legislation indicate that the unions can find support for
their collective bargaining efforts in state courts. Furthermore, there should be support
from public school boards which would benefit from the use of arbitration as an impasse
procedure because arbitration provides an effective tool to avoid strikes and is less costly
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than other impasse resolution procedures.130 Thus, in order to achieve leverage to
participate in the determination of the final outcomes of negotiation and achieve goals,
public school teachers’ unions should seek to include arbitration as a resolution procedure
to impasses during negotiations with school boards in collective bargaining legislation.131
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, public school teachers’ unions should encourage legislatures to
include mandatory arbitration impasse procedures in state collective bargaining statutes.
Teachers’ unions will be able to successfully influence the enactment of mandatory
arbitration impasse procedures because they have become powerful political entities
which have the ability to effect legislative decision making. When arbitration is the
means to achieve resolution of collective bargaining impasses, unions are likely to be
able to secure higher wages for their members. Moreover, mandatory arbitration to settle
negotiation impasses in public education collective bargaining is preferable to strikes and
alternative resolution options. The Chicago Teachers’ Union strike confirms that not only
does resolution of negotiation impasses by arbitration make teachers’ unions’ goals more
attainable, but also that teachers’ strikes result in detrimental consequences. Furthermore,
the controversy surrounding the Act 10 legislation in Wisconsin illustrates that mediation
and fact-finding resolution procedures do not provide teachers’ unions with adequate
leverage to shape the final outcome of negotiations. Therefore, in order to best represent
the interests of their members in the collective bargaining process, public school teachers’
unions should pressure states to require that impasses in collective bargaining be resolved
by arbitration.
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